When the Chareidi entrepreneur, Lev Levaiv acquired the Ramat Aviv Shopping Center and decided not to operate its movie theaters on Shabbat, the rage of the spokesmen of the secular community was vented upon him.  In fact, the law permits one to dispose of one's property according to one's wishes, but the secular representatives rose up against Levaiv in the name of logic and tolerance and other such claims, whose main point was that the needs of the public do not always square with the dry letter of the law. 

The legal ruling with regard to work on Shabbat on Kibbutz Tzir'ah roused the secular spokespersons to the opposite reaction.  This time they claim that we must adhere devoutly to the letter of the law, even if it is entirely clear that the judge interpreted it contrary to the intention of the legislator, who wanted to prevent work on Shabbat. 

However, not only the secular are guilty of hypocrisy, but also the religious community, who in the case of the Ramat Aviv Shopping Center insisted on honoring the right of the consumer, whereas in the case of Kibbuz Tzir'ah they demand that the intention of the legislator be honored and not the precise formulation of the law. 

For both of these groups, the law is but an instrument to lean upon or reject according to convenience.  The position of the religious is clear.  They want to extend as much as they can the influence of the halakha upon the ways of life in the country, and they use their political power to that end.  By contrast, the non-theistic Jewish conception with regard to the desired character of Shabbat has never been clarified.  The positions are fixed with regard to the substance of the disagreements which flare up periodically, but the combination of these positions does not amount to a general secular theory. 

A consistent secular position, one that annuls the religious meaning of Shabbat and leaves in place its social meaning, is likely to allow each person to choose for himself the day of rest that suits him.  It is possible to carry this a long way and to suggest the complete cancellation of the law concerning the hours of work and rest, on the assumption that in our society the powers of the employer and the employee have balanced themselves and it is no longer necessary to defend the employee against the arbitrary will of the employer.  Everything should be decided in free negotiation between employer and employee and between each person and himself.  

It is clear that the implementation of these two positions would quickly lead to complete secularization of the public sector, but even the most fanatic secularists realize that one must allow pious Jews to live their Sabbaths in an atmosphere protected from the turmoil of the secular sphere.  The customary solution is of the socio-geographic kind:  in a place where the majority are religious, the public sector is adapted to a religious way of life, and where the majority are secular, the public sector is fitted to their way of life.  

But really, what is the character of the public Sabbath towards which the secular aspire?  It seems to me that the great majority yearn to preserve "something" that will distinguish between holy and profane, but they want that the individual should be allowed to decide what that "something" is that suits his spiritual needs.  

The problem is that the combination of private wishes absolutely dissolves the atmosphere of the Sabbath, because all the networks of work are interwoven with one another, to the point that they cannot be separated.  

Private automobile travel on Shabbat brings in its wake the work of vehicle and fuel services, and restaurants, and suppliers, and traffic policemen, and employees of the Public Works Department and all that kind of thing, and it overwhelms those without automobiles.  On the other hand, allowing public transportation, which from a social perspective is just, enlarges even further the circle of workers on Shabbat.  

The opening of commercial centers outside the cities brings in its wake the opening of stores in the heart of the cities, both because very quickly the periphery becomes the center, and because those without cars also have a right to go shopping on Shabbat, and also because the merchants in the city are not willing to be deprived.  The granting of permission to the workers of "corporations" (the case of Kibbutz Tzir'ah) will necessitate legal constructions suitable to the ruling of the district judge.  

These are just examples from a collection that removes completely the Sabbath "something."  The secular community can let reality run its own course, but it must admit that this reality determines the forces of the market.  Whoever thinks that the forces of the market embody the collective intelligence must consciously surrender that "something" of the Sabbath and prepare for seventh days that are completely secular.  

On the other hand, whoever refuses to worship the market and yearns for a bit of the holy mixed in with the secular routine must think about a secular formulation that will limit in some way the right of the individual to do whatever he pleases on Shabbat.